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ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes that the U.S. Navy deter and, if necessary, combat 
potential minelayers by pursuing a "pro-active" offensive mine warfare strategy. 
Central to this proposed strategy is the development, acquisition, and use of 
Remote Controlled (RECO) mines. It is argued that, given the historical problems 
the United States has had in the area of naval mine warfare, a strategy aimed at the 
aggressive deterrence of enemy mine laying be embraced so as to project forces 
ashore in future amphibious operations. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Historically, the United States has failed to fully appreciate the overall importance of mine 
warfare and, more specifically, the strategic importance of preventing an enemy from laying 
mines. 
This thesis proposes a "pro-active" strategy for offensive mining and mine 
countermeasures with the goal of deterring an enemy from laying mines. The proliferation of 
mines and mine technologies has brought about a situation in which "traditional" mine defensive 
measures have become increasingly less cost-effective. Simply put, it has become increasingly 
expensive and risky to try and offset each incremental advancement in mine capabilities with 
"passive" mine countermeasures alone. It is necessary therefore that the U.S. Navy consider new 
options to deter and, should deterrence fail, combat future mine threats. Through the employment 
of Remote Controlled (RECO) mines, the United States may not only be able to deter an 
aggressor from laying mines, but may also achieve a tactical advantage in the event such 
deterrence fails. The long-term benefits of such an "offensive" mine warfare strategy would be 
two-fold. First, it would send a strong signal that the United States is committed to the safe 
passage of U.S. naval vessels and freedom of the high seas. And secondly, it would produce 
certain important tactical advantages were an aggressor nation to engage in mining nevertheless. 
The United States achieved a decisive victory in Desert Storm. The victory might have 
lost some of its luster however, if the coalition offensive had required an amphibious assault 
against Iraqi defenses in Kuwait. The reason would have been the potentially high cost involved 
in breaching the enemy's offshore minefields. 
As the U.S. military enters an era of uncertainty and dwindling resources it is incumbent 
that defense funds be allocated in a judicious and wise manner. Mines have been, and will 
always be, a significant part of every future naval battle and the United States must refocus its 
mine warfare strategy to address this vital concern. The United States must embrace a strategy 
that is aimed at deterring a nation from laying mines if it is to project forces ashore in future 
conflicts. 
IX 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the deterrent effect that a "pro-active"1 
mine warfare strategy will have on an aggressor who engages in mine laying activities. 
A pro-active offensive mining and mine countermeasures (MCM) strategy may not only 
enable the United States to better deter a potential enemy from laying mines, but may also 
send a strong "signal" to that nation (as well as other nations) that retaliation will be swift 
and severe for those who are not deterred. Various offensive mining and MCM strategies 
are offered in this study, but one which seems to be particularly attractive includes the 
use of Remote Controlled (RECO) mines and Identification Friend or Foe for Minefields 
(IFFM). This technology has been available since the early 1980s, but so far has not 
been accepted for political reasons. The following chapters illustrate the advantages as 
well as the disadvantages to the United States of employing a pro-active mine warfare 
strategy. 
The proliferation of mines and mine technology is also examined for the simple 
reason that, over the past few years, it has allowed even the poorest nation the ability to 
possess state-of-the-art mine technology at a relatively low cost. This sobering reality, 
coupled with the limited success the United States has historically experienced in the area 
of mine warfare, should convince the United States to approach the problem of the 
"weapon that waits" differently. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Rules of Engagement (ROE) that govern the 
actions of an on-scene commander of a naval vessel are also examined to illustrate the 
vulnerable and potentially life threatening situation the commander of a naval vessel is 
'The 1994-1995 U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Plan, Second Edition, highlights the vital 
importance of a "pro-active" offensively orientated mine warfare strategy. Mine warfare 
encompasses both mining and mine countermeasures activities. Offensive mining includes 
the employment of mines to deter or restrict an enemy from mining. Offensive MCM 
includes actions taken against an enemy or intelligence gathered to prevent mines from 
being laid in the first place. 
in once mines are laid in international waters. Current ROE concerning the "right of self- 
defense" do not allow an on-scene commander the freedom to neutralize an enemy vessel 
confirmed to be laying mines. Therefore, a ship and its crew are placed in a life 
threatening situation with limited retalitory actions available to them. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Throughout history, mine warfare has been perceived as an unglamorous and 
insignificant dimension of naval strategic planning. Recent world events indicate that 
there will be more rather than fewer regional conflicts. Some will undoubtedly involve 
mines. Therefore, the United States must be strategically and tactically ready to deter and 
if necessary compel others from using mines. Mines, if left uncontested, will impede the 
safe execution of U.S. naval activities and constrain the ability to pursue the Nations 
interests. 
The threat of naval mines is not new. The world has had experience with various 
sorts of mine warfare for over 200 years. Although the modern mine bears little 
resemblance to its nineteenth century antecedent in terms of technical sophistication, the 
original definition given to what then were called "torpedoes" still holds true: an 
unattended underwater explosive. 
Anti-ship devices of one sort or another have been used since Grecian times, but 
their failure rate was extremely high. The problem that plagued the early proponents of 
mine warfare was in designing a firing system that would fire at the most opportune 
moment - preferably when an enemy ship was within striking distance - not when the 
mine was being planted, which was frequently the case. The development of mines has 
come a long way since then and today just about anyone (i.e., non-state actors and 
international terrorists) can acquire mines of various sophistication. (See Appendix A). 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States and other NATO navies were 
extremely mine-conscious, building several hundreds of minesweepers and minehunters. 
But then came a 20 year hiatus in the U.S. Navy's construction of MCM ships. Yet, in 
every conflict in modern history in which the United States has participated "it has been 
required to use some form of mine countermeasures forces, ships, helicopters or both."2 
The proliferation of modern mines and mine technologies will almost certainly 
compound the mine threat to world sea communications in the future. The most effective 
means of countering this threat appears to be an aggressive strategy of deterrence toward 
those who engage in mining activities. 
Mine warfare is, and will always be a vital concern to the U.S. strategic objective 
of "maintaining control of the seas" and safely projecting forces ashore in support of 
amphibious operations. Mine warfare, and more importantly, U.S. credibility, are at a 
"pivotal point" in history, and the humbling lessons learned from past conflicts should not 
be neglected any longer! 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to illustrate the potentially dangerous mine warfare 
situation that the United States will undoubtedly face as it attempts to project forces 
ashore in support of amphibious operations. Its aim is to re-focus current mine warfare 
strategy from the traditional defensive strategy to a more offensively orientated, or "pro- 
active" strategy. It is hypothesized that this type of strategy will deter a potential 
opponent, thereby enhancing the United States tactical advantage in a mine related 
conflict and enable U.S. naval forces to safely control the seas. 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis focuses on mining and mine countermeasure strategies that are 
accepted in theory but frequently neglected in practice. It identifies tactics that if 
employed could prevent a nation from laying mines, or give the United States a tactical 
advantage if deterrence should fail. The laws, regulations and ROE pertaining to mine 
warfare are analyzed to determine the most effective method, or combination of methods, 
that would deter a nation from initiating a mining campaign. Realizing that a "pro-active" 
2Wettern, Desmond, "Coping With The Hidden Threat," Sea Power, March 1991, p. 
40. 
strategy has its drawbacks in terms of escalation and political negotiating, it is suggested 
that the implications of not embracing such a strategy, would be far more detrimental to 
the United States in the long run. 
E. RESEARCH LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY 
Research data was obtained from official government directives and policies, 
journals, previous theses, Department of Defense and Navy regulations and manuals, and 
personal interviews. Information on Remote Controlled (RECO) mines and Identification 
Friend or Foe for Minefields (IFFM) was obtained from the Mine Warfare / EOD Branch 
(N852) and the Warfare Analysis Department of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
Dahlgren Division, White Oak Detachment at Silver Spring, Maryland. 
Research was conducted via personal interview and telephone interviews with 
various mining and mine countermeasures personnel. Interviews with mining personnel 
centered around the technological aspects of RECO and IFFM, as well as the current 
status of both capabilities. Interviews with mine countermeasures personnel dealt with 
the advantages and disadvantages of a offensively orientated MCM strategy. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II of this thesis addresses the historical problems inherent with mine 
warfare as well as the various types of minefield typically employed. 
Chapter III provides a historical case analysis of mine warfare operations to 
illustrate how mines or the threat of mines have significantly altered the outcome of 
numerous naval battles. 
Chapter IV focuses on the proliferation of mines and mine technologies. 
Specifically, the various mines that are on the open market and the technological 
capabilities available to enhance the characteristics of these mines. 
Chapter V introduces the use of offensive mining through the employment of 
Remote Controlled (RECO) mines and Identification Friend or Foe for Minefields (IFFM) 
which adds a greater degree of safety and tactical maneuverability to RECO minefields. 
It also proposes four generic mining strategies that would enable the United States to 
achieve tactical superiority of the sea, if deterrence should fail. And finally, it addresses 
offensive mine countermeasures capabilities and the vital importance of accurate and 
timely intelligence gathered through diligent reconnaissance and surveillance assets. 
Chapter VI introduces the JCS Rules Of Engagement (ROE) that govern the 
actions of an on-scene commander when confronted with a vessel known to be laying 
mines. 
Chapter VII highlights the legal implications associated with mines and 
specifically, remote controlled mines. 
Chapter VIII contains an analysis of the various tactics suggested as well as 
specific recommendations for the future. 

II.  MINE WARFARE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a basic overview of naval mines and mine warfare. It also 
highlights the historical difficulties that most countries have had countering mines. The 
use of Remote-Controlled (RECO) mines is introduced in this chapter to develop an 
understanding for its effectiveness and the flexibility it can afford the United States, 
politically as well as strategically. 
B.  THE CURRENT DILEMMA 
...When you can't go where you want to, when you want to, you haven't 
got command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rock-bottom 
foundation for all our War plans. We've been plenty submarine-conscious 
and air-conscious. Now we're going to start getting mine-conscious - 
beginning last week.3 
Admiral Forrest Sherman, USN 
Chief of Naval Operations, 1950 
This quote sums up the unfortunate situation that still faces the United States mine 
warfare community more than four decades later. As a maritime nation and a proponent 
of free and unmolested access to the seas by all peaceful nations, the United States can 
no longer afford to minimize the crucial mine warfare lessons of the past. Mines have 
always been a powerful political tool as well as a show-stopping military weapon. They 
have become even more important today as the poor man's weapon of choice that can 
frustrate the movements and greatly impede the overall success of even the strongest 
navies. U.S. national security and defense planning clearly rests on the ability to use the 
seas freely. This demands that, while the United States wrestles with the long-term 
problem of clearing mines, it should meanwhile focus on the near-term strategic and 
3Cagle, M.W. and Manson, F.A., The Sea War in Korea, 1957, p. 142. 
tactical advantages of offensive mine warfare as a potential deterrent. This "pro-active" 
MCM strategy may not only deter an aggressor, but it can also signal U.S. resolve that 
may thwart others in the future. 
C.  DEFINING MINE WARFARE 
A war in which enemies seldom meet and battle is rarely joined, but death 
and destruction always mark the field. Where the big ships fight their 
battles, and the little mine craft have already been to do their dull and dirty 
duty, in which there is no glory. Where the fighting fleets sail to victory, 
there are the seas of glory. But where the little ships go, there is the most 
dangerous sea.  This is mine warfare.4 
Mine warfare is by definition the strategic and tactical use of sea mines and their 
countermeasures. It constitutes both the laying of mines with the aim of sinking the 
opponent's shipping, or at least hinder his use of the seas, and mine countermeasures, 
which include all measures for countering the mine by reducing or preventing danger or 
damage to ships and personnel.5 Mining and mine countermeasures are two distinctly 
different operations. Anything undertaken actively (sweeping or hunting) or passively 
(reconnaissance and surveillance) to defeat mines can be defined as part of MCM. 
Traditionally viewed as a defensive measure, MCM means much more in fact. Since the 
American Civil War, MCM craft have often been at the forefront of offensive operations, 
leading strike forces into and out of ports, and clearing channels and staging areas in 
advance of the fleet. The MCM force motto is: "Where the fleet goes, we've been."6 In 
a broader sense, offensive MCM operations can involve most naval assets and may 
require the assistance of land based forces as well.  The 1994-1995 Mine Warfare Plan 
4Lott, Arnold S., LCDR, USN, Most Dangerous Sea. 1959, p. 3. 
5Van Waning, J. Jan W., "Naval Mine Warfare," International Military and Defense 
Encyclopedia, Volume 4, 1993, pp. 1759-1760. 
6Melia,  Tamara M.,  Damn The Torpedoes,  A  Short History  of Naval  Mine 
Countermeasures 1777-1991, p. 4. 
emphasizes the fact that the most effective counter to sea mines is not their clearance, but 
the prevention of their being laid in the first place.7 Therefore, offensive mine warfare 
strategy may be crucial to the success of an amphibious assault. Today, MCM operations 
aim at reducing the threat of enemy mining by both offensive and defensive operations 
against enemy mine laying agents and their supporting facilities. This is a pro-active 
MCM approach that the United States has been reluctant to pursue for political and 
military reasons, but one that could send a clear and decisive "signal" that the United 
States is willing to use force to maintain freedom of the seas. 
In order to examine why the U.S. Navy, has not sustained an enthusiastic interest 
in mine warfare one must focus on the lessons learned, and most importantly, those not 
learned throughout history. 
D.  THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM 
Many naval officers still see mine warfare as a rather undignified and insignificant 
task. Recent conflicts have shown, however, that disposing of even the simplest and old- 
fashioned mines may require the use of sophisticated and expensive resources or, more 
importantly, the altering of strategies and tactics. Many naval officers would rather echo 
the exasperated command of Flag Officer David Farragut when he entered Mobile Bay 
on 5 August 1864, exclaiming, "Damn the torpedoes, full steam ahead." 
The U.S. Navy must begin building a foundation of officers and mine warfare 
experts who are not only well trained but who will build on the knowledge and 
experience of others in order to construct a community of professionals capable of 
countering one of the most difficult threats of the 21st century. The absence of a 
dedicated "mine warfare" community (albeit not individual dedication) can be summed 
up in the following statement: 
71994 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 32. 
The largest single deterrent to an effective U.S. mine warfare force has 
been our failure to train and develop mine warfare officers. Officers from 
all naval communities are assigned generally on a one-time haphazard 
basis. There is no progression in the community because there is no 
community...The first action necessary to turn things around for the U.S. 
Navy in mine warfare must be to remove the negative stigma of [mine 
warfare]...8 
As Admiral Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations said, "No union has a 
vested interest in mines, which have no bridges for captains to pace."9 
The U.S. Navy is arguably no better prepared strategically for mine warfare today 
than it was when it lost control of the seas to Korean minefields at Wonsan in 1951. 
The main lesson of the Wonsan operation is that no so-called subsidiary 
branch of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be 
neglected or relegated to such a minor role in the future. Wonsan also 
taught us that we can be denied freedom of movement to an enemy 
objective through the intelligent use of mines by an alert foe.10 
Although there are many technological reasons why the United States is no better 
prepared for a mine warfare battle today, the most important ones center around current 
U.S. strategy and tactics. U.S. mine warfare strategy and tactics claim to support the 
"pro-active" use of offensive mining and mine countermeasures, but the reality is that it 
is neglected as a viable option. The lack of a "true" mine warfare doctrine also illustrates 
this point." But there are other reasons as well, that extend beyond the material and 
doctrinal inadequacies.    Intra-service rivalry among the Navy warfare communities, 
8Rogers, Edward, LT, USN, "Mines Wait But We Can't!" Proceedings, August 1982, 
p. 51. 
9Zumwalt, Elmo R., On Watch: A Memoir, 1976, p. 64. 
10Cagle, M.W., and Manson, FA., p. 151. 
"Interview with Capt. Franklin G. (Mike) West, USN (Ret), on 25 August 1994 at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, which pertained to the Navy's current study of a mine 
warfare doctrine that will encompass new strategies and tactics for mine warfare. 
10 
mismanagement, and lack of a long term plan have forced the mine warfare community 
to take a back-seat to other more "vital" missions. Unlike other NATO navies, the U.S. 
Navy does not have a foundation of trained mine warfare personnel. There is no officer 
community born and bred to the mine warfare service. Mine warfare billets, ashore and 
afloat, are manned for the most part by officers from other warfare communities. The 
manning of the Navy's ocean minesweepers (MSOs) clearly demonstrates this problem. 
The commanding officers of the MSOs view their tours as early commands as they 
progress from Executive Officer of a frigate to Commanding Officer of a "real" surface 
combatant. They are hard pressed to meet the normal administrative shipboard 
requirements associated with their first commands, hence they do not have enough time 
to acquire expertise in their ships' warfare specialty. Today's commanding officers of 
MCM vessels are no better prepared tactically to hunt mines than a destroyer officer is 
to assume command of a submarine. The MCM expert on board a U.S. minesweeper is 
typically a first tour lieutenant (junior grade). But the most obvious problem hampering 
the mine warfare community has been its failure to train and develop mine warfare 
officers. Officers from all naval communities are assigned generally on a one-time, 
haphazard basis. Therefore, there is no progression within the community. As Admiral 
Kidd said just prior to the clearance operation in Haiphong harbor in 1973, 
"Minesweeping seems to acquire sex appeal once every 25 years [when a crisis occurs]. 
The intervening hiatus is quite a hurdle to overcome."12 
Tamara Moser Melia, naval historian and mine warfare expert explains: 
It is difficult for the uninitiated to separate the excuses from the reasons 
why we have repeatedly failed to sustain effective mine countermeasures 
in the U.S. Navy. Lack of a basic mine warfare knowledge throughout the 
U.S. Navy generally results in over generalization about causes and effects, 
leaving many naval officers with the impression that the excuses often 
offered are adequate reasons why we are not more effective. Such 
attitudes increase, rather than decrease institutional prejudices against the 
12Kidd, Issac, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Material, Message to CINCPACFLT, 
February 1973, cited in Melia, p. 111. 
11 
development of the adequate, and often expensive, ways to truly increase 
the operational effectiveness of our mine forces. And no matter what great 
platforms and systems we can develop to solve the MCM problems, 
institutional prejudice itself can continually cripple our mine warfare 
effectiveness, as we saw most recently in Desert Storm.13 
E.  TYPES OF NAVAL MINES 
Modern naval mines are versatile and variable weapons. They range from 
relatively unsophisticated and indiscriminate contact mines to highly technical, target- 
selective devices with state-of-the-art homing guidance capability. Today's mines may 
be armed and or detonated by physical contact, acoustic or magnetic signature, or 
sensitivity to changes in water pressure generated by passing vessels. Mines may be 
deployed by air, surface, or subsurface platforms. Armed mines are either planted with 
all safety devices withdrawn or they are armed following emplacement but will not 
detonate until certain parameters are satisfied. So-called "controlled" mines (including 
mines with remote control activation devices) have no destructive capability until 
affirmatively activated by some form of arming order.14 
There are two main categories of mines: controlled and independent mines. 
Controlled mines can be activated or de-activated by the user after they have been laid. 
The earliest controlled mines consisted of a series of large explosive charges deposited 
on the seabed (or riverbed) connected by electrical cables to a position on the shore 
overlooking the minefield. When a target was observed passing within the vicinity of the 
mines, an electrical signal from ashore triggered detonation. Modern cable-controlled 
mines may contain detecting mechanisms that signal the presence of a ship or submarine 
"Comments taken from a speech given as part of the Carl Menneken Lecture series 
in Mine Warfare, to the Undersea Warfare Curriculum of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
by Tamara M. Melia, on 28 July 1994. 
14Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 9, Commander's Handbook of the Law of Naval 
Operations, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Systems, Chapter 9, paragraph 9.2.1., 
p. 9-4. 
12 
to a remote station, or they may be operated in conjunction with some separate means of 
detection. Controlled mines have typically been employed in protective or defensive 
minefields, but subsequent chapters illustrate the advantages of using remote controlled 
(RECO) mines for "offensive" purposes, as well as a long-term deterrent. 
Independent mines rely on their own sensors for firing. This type of mine can 
be further divided into contact mines and influence mines. A contact mine is designed 
to explode when it makes physical contact with a target. A contact mine may be set off 
by direct contact with the hull of a ship: when the hull or propellers catch a buoyant line 
attached to one of the horns or switches of the mine (the snagline mine); or by the ferrous 
hull touching a copper or brass antenna fitted to the mine. The latter sets off a galvanic 
action that fires the mine (antenna mine). 
Influence mines are actuated by the effect of a target on some physical condition 
in the vicinity of the mine or on radiations emanating from the mine. The first influence 
mines were used in World War II, and included magnetic devices, which relied for their 
activation on a disturbance of the earth's magnetic field. More recently, other actuation 
methods, such as the use of the electrical potential within the water (the underwater 
electric potential mine), have been developed. Modern influence mines normally have 
a combination of two or more sensor types in their firing circuits (combined influence 
mine).15 
F.  MINING OPERATIONS 
History is replete with examples of the mine's influential role in naval warfare. 
The benefits of a vigorous mining capability go beyond the ability to just sink ships. 
Mines present a threat to a much broader range of targets than any other naval weapon 
and can affect maritime operations across the full spectrum of conflict. The mere threat 
of a mine is sometimes all that is needed to alter an enemy's battle plans. 
15Van Waning, J. Jan W., "Naval Mine Warfare," International Military and Defense 
Encyclopedia, Volume 4, 1993, pp. 1755-1761. 
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The mine's all-weather, 24 hour a day potential to inflict extensive destruction 
provides a potent military and political presence. The mine is unobtrusive and does not 
require platforms on station or constant monitoring. Minefields, unlike other weapons, 
are usually invisible and do not lend themselves easily to TV or other graphic adversarial 
propaganda. A minefield is a collection of explosive devices positioned to impose 
strategic or tactical constraints on the operational use of an area by surface ships or 
submarines. It is not a stand-alone weapon; it must be considered part of a total strategic 
network in a military campaign. The effects of a minefield can be two-fold: it can 
physically sink or damage ships, and it can psychologically threaten or exhibit the 
potential to sink or damage ships.16 
Because a declared minefield can only cause damage and casualties if the enemy 
takes the risk of transiting, the minefield can form an intermediate step between 
negotiations and the escalation of a conflict. Minefields are laid for offensive, defensive, 
or protective purposes, depending on the strategic or tactical objective in mind. The type 
of minefield employed is usually dependent on the available numbers and types of mines 
and minelayers, on geographic and environmental circumstances, and on possible enemy 
reactions and countermeasures. 
The objective of strategic mining campaigns is to deny the enemy free access to 
or use of the sea areas considered vital to one's own war effort, or to reduce and impede 
the enemy's warmaking potential. Depending on the importance of the threat, a mining 
campaign can be directed against naval surface forces, submarines, or seaborne 
communications.  Sustained attrition mining is essentially strategic in nature. 
Tactical mining is used to support a limited military objective in time and scope. 
Historically, the mine was not an effective tactical weapon because its deployment 
required too much preparation time (i.e., arming, loading, clock setting, etc.) for 
immediate use. Modern mines are much more suitable for last-minute deployment but 
limited delivery platform availability is still a major constraint:  It is for this reason that 
I6NWP 27-4, "Mining Operations" Chapter 3, Paragraph 3.1., p. 3-2. 
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the RECO mine becomes an attractive alternative because its deployability is far less 
dependent on last-minute availability of delivery platforms. 
G.  SUMMARY 
This chapter illustrated the problems plaguing the mine warfare community as well 
as suggestions for improvement. Mines will be a significant factor in future naval 
operations and the success of the Navy in mine related conflicts depends on its ability to 
educate military decision makers on its future importance. 
Mines are also examined in this chapter to highlight the unique qualities that make 
them the "weapon of choice" for most nations. Most nations have traditionally viewed 
mines as cheap, reasonably simple, and reliable weapon whose attributes have long 
constituted their fundamental appeal. Because of these characteristics, the mine is 
producible in great numbers at relatively low costs; large numbers can be stockpiled 
without a constant need for expensive maintenance routines; they can be kept in the 
inventory for a long time; and older mines are readily adaptable to more modern fusing 
techniques. The mine is a cost-effective weapon for another reason as well: its defeat 
requires a disproportionately great investment in forces and technology. For those who 
must wage naval war, these virtues are impressive. 
Therefore, possessing a RECO capability becomes an attractive alternative to 
reacting to another nations mining campaign. RECO would allow the United States the 
flexibility of laying mines prior to, or shortly after, the outbreak of hostilities. This is one 
of the many advantages of RECO, for a mining campaign with mines that are turned off 
(unarmed) can be initiated at the first indication of hostilities and turn on (armed) if and 
when the situation escalates. 
Before changes to U.S. mine warfare strategies and tactics can be implemented, 
mine warfare needs to address the mindset of the mainstream Navy - the users of MCM 
services. Operational commanders of major naval forces must be taught that their 
interests, the Navy's, and that of their nation, are best served through the initiation of an 
effective mine warfare strategy.  It must be understood that mine warfare is a vital part 
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of all naval combat operations and to disregard the lessons of past conflicts will place the 
United States in an extremely vulnerable position as it attempts to project forces ashore 
in future conflicts. 
Whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything. 
-Themistocles (524-460 B.C.) 
16 
III.  MINE WARFARE CASE EXAMPLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The following case histories are chosen to illustrate the strategic and tactical 
lessons learned from mine warfare. Mines have crippled, stalled, and forced changes in 
battle plans throughout history, and these historical examples represent the overall 
importance that mines have played in past conflicts, as well as the strategic advantage of 
offensive mining and offensive mine countermeasures. 
B. THE CIVIL WAR 
1.  Mobile Bay 
One of the older lessons in mine warfare goes back to Flag Officer Farragut's 
dramatic penetration of the mine infested waters of Mobile Bay in 1864. The image of 
Farragut created in the press and historical records is that of a daring man who risked his 
life (and that of his crew) in the face of an unknown mine threat. The facts of the 
situation are that Farragut was extremely worried about the mine threat and its 
catastrophic potential. One night, Farragut's flag lieutenant and personal friend, LT. 
Watson, volunteered to personally survey the waters leading into Mobile Bay. Watson's 
innovative reconnaissance techniques led to the discovery of numerous mines, which he 
marked as accurately as possible, and reported back to Farragut. Watson concluded that, 
due to their physical condition, the majority of the mines did not pose a risk to Farragut's 
fleet. Farragut decided to enter the harbor just slightly astern of the sloop Brooklyn which 
was rigged with a rudimentary mine catcher. No sooner had the lead ship, the Tecumseh, 
entered the harbor, when it struck a mine and quickly sank to the bottom of the bay. 
Farragut was in a vulnerable position and had to decide whether or not it was worth the 
risk to steam on. He challenged the minefield and halfway into it was heard barking the 
order: "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead."17 Watson's brave efforts no doubt set the 
17Melia, p. 3. 
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stage for the success of the mission, for the intelligence he provided about the condition 
of the mine line greatly influenced Farragut's decision to take the risk. Farragut prepared 
to battle the mines as carefully as he prepared his vessels for the fight. He obtained 
sufficient information about the condition of the mines and the location of the mine line 
to make a calculated decision. Farragut did not merely damn the torpedoes at Mobile 
Bay, but instead hunted, examined, and disabled several mines before steaming into the 
bay. His meticulous approach is a crucial lesson in risk assessment and points to the 
importance of accurate and timely intelligence. 
C.  WORLD WAR I 
1.  The Dardanelles Straits 
In 1915, the British and French fleets attempted to force the narrow Dardanelles 
Straits in an effort to attack the Germans from the south, drive a wedge between Turkey 
and Bulgaria, and open critical lines of communication with their Russian allies. The 
Turks had reportedly begun to mine the Straits in 1914 with drifting mines in what 
arguably became one the most decisive mining campaigns ever initiated.18 
The allies initially planned to force the Straits by naval attack alone; success was 
completely dependent on the ability of slow minesweepers to clear a passage through the 
heavily protected straits. In order to avoid being spotted by the enemy's gunners ashore, 
the minesweepers, which were manned by civilians, made numerous attempts under the 
cover of darkness, to sweep the Straits. Without protective gunfire support, they had little 
chance. On 18 March 1915, the Anglo-French naval force decided to go ahead with its 
assault anyway. Two battleships and two cruisers were lost in the attempt. The problem 
was this: "The battleships could not force the Straits until the minefield had been cleared - 
the minefield could not be cleared until the concealed guns which defended them could 
18J.S. Meacham in "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the Decisions 
of Commanders," Naval War College Review, June 1967 cites Turkish records to the 
effect that the first mines were laid on 3 August 1914. Most mines were actually laid 
after 1 January 1915. 
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be destroyed, and they could not be destroyed until the Peninsula Gallipoli was in (allied) 
hands; hence, (the allies had) to seize it with the Army."19 The disastrous Gallipoli 
landing was the eventual result of an effective turkish mining campaign. 
D.  WORLD WAR II 
1. Normandy 
As might be expected, mines were a significant factor in the Allied pre-invasion 
planning of D-Day in June 1944. The Allies were encouraged by their successful attacks 
on the German minelayers during the months preceding the landing, but insufficient 
intelligence with respect to recent German innovations in mine technology almost brought 
catastrophe. Unbeknownst to the Allies, the Germans had developed a pressure mine, 
called "Oyster." During the early months of 1944, Hitler ordered that 4,000 Oyster mines 
be sown around Normandy, Le Havre, and Cherbourg. The Germans, guessing that the 
invasion would take place before the end of May, tailored their mines to sterilize 
themselves by the end of the month to set the stage for friendly E-boat operations in that 
area in early June. Six days before the Allies crossed the channel thousands of Nazi 
mines flooded and sank themselves as planned. The Allies were extremely fortunate that 
their losses were limited to just 50 small landing craft.20 The casualties would surely 
have been higher if the Germans had "guessed" the actual Allied invasion date correctly. 
Once again, the importance of accurate and timely intelligence cannot be overestimated. 
2. Japan 
a.  Haiphong, 1943 
On 16 October 1943, a single U.S. B-24 bomber dropped three mines in 
Haiphong harbor. A month later another B-24 dropped three more mines there. The first 
drop resulted in the sinking of the 3,000-ton freighter Shozan; the second, the 500-ton 
19Meacham, cited in Gregory K. Hartmann, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the 
U.S. Navy, 1979, p. 47. 
20Lott, p. 185. 
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Totsuya. A ten-ship Japanese convoy, afraid to enter the port, loitered outside the harbor 
for several hours, then decided to head for Northern Hainan Island. There, the 14th Army 
Air Force detected and sunk six of the ships.21 A small 30-ton ship was later sunk by 
one of the remaining mines, and the port was subsequently closed to steel-hulled ships 
for the remainder of the war. 
b. Palau Atoll, 1944 
On 30 March 1944, U.S. planes from three aircraft carriers dropped mines 
at the entrance to the harbor at Palau Atoll. Thirty-two Japanese ships were inside the 
harbor. Although the Japanese crews knew they had been detected, they preferred to stay 
put, rather than to risk the "invisible" enemy. As a result, the ships became sitting ducks 
for the subsequent air raids: 23 were sunk. The United States added insult to injury and 
dropped more mines inside the harbor. The Japanese thought they had done a sufficient 
job of clearing the mines until the first ship hit a mine and was severely damaged. 
Subsequently, the Japanese abandoned Palau as a naval base. 
c. Operation Starvation, 1945 
During 1945, the United States conducted an extensive offensive mining 
campaign aimed at rupturing the Japanese economic and military supply lines. "Operation 
Starvation" began in March 1945, and included the mining of Sasebo, Kure, and 
Shimonoseki Strait. The Japanese were forced to radically alter their shipping routes. 
The battleship Yamato was diverted from Shimonoseki Strait to Bungo Strait, was sighted, 
attacked, and sunk. The Japanese incurred considerable losses trying to navigate the 
hazardous waters, but they had little choice: they had to either face the risk of the mines, 
or be subject to economic starvation. Once the United States realized that the Japanese 
were challenging the minefields, it began to lay mines with a more sensitive setting so 
they would detonate only when a target was a sure kill. The goal switched from 
deterrence to ship-sinking. 
2ILott, p. 218. 
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Operation Starvation was one of the many campaigns that contributed to 
Japan's decisive defeat in World War II. The battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, Tarawa, 
Peleliu, and Leyte Gulf unquestionably brought the war closer to an end, but the slow 
process of blockading the distant and critical sea lanes of Japan reduced her to economic, 
industrial, and personal starvation. 
The U.S. mining campaign was successful beyond expectation, as it 
accounted for the sinking of 670 Japanese ships and the loss of over 40 percent of 
Japanese merchant crews. In addition to bottling-up Japanese ships, the Americans kept 
Japanese minesweepers busy, with over 20,000 men and 349 ships dedicated to clearing 
the sea lanes and harbors. Speaking for all Japanese mine experts, Captain Kyuzo 
Tamura, UN, told postwar interrogators: 
The results of the B-29 mining were so effective against the shipping that 
it eventually starved the country. I think you probably could have 
shortened the war by beginning earlier.22 
Only 15 minelaying B-29's were lost during Operation Starvation, which 
equates to one lost plane for every 45 ships that were sunk. The effects of a well planned 
offensive mining campaign can be staggering, for one of the little known but highly 
humanitarian aspects of mine warfare is that: 
A mine blockade essentially enables the winner to win without killing. 
Enemy ships lost in a minefield enter it by their own choice; the enemy 
is free to keep his ships in port and save them if he wishes. But more 
importantly, mines never destroy homes, hospitals, or industrial facilities 
necessary for peacetime rehabilitation, nor do they indiscriminately wipe 
out non-combatant civilians.23 
22Lott, p. 227. 
23Lott, p. 223. 
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E.  THE KOREAN WAR 
1.  Wonsan 
During the early months of the Korean War, a planned amphibious assault at 
Wonsan was "delayed for weeks as U.S. and allied minesweepers in what became known 
as Operation Yo-Yo" cleared the approaches to the beach.24 The reason was that the 
North Koreans had planted over 3,000 moored and ground mines. The United States had 
many difficulties in sweeping the area for the following reasons: first, the possibility of 
encountering numerous mines was not fully appreciated far enough in advance, and MCM 
forces were given only ten days to do the job. Second, intelligence information on the 
types and number of mines was inadequate. Third, the charts and maps of the area were 
outdated.25 The commander of the amphibious task force, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, 
sent the following message to Vice Admiral Turner C. Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far 
East, "The U.S. Navy has lost command of the sea in Korean waters."26 
Vice Admiral Joy summed up the value of mine warfare with the following 
conclusion: 
The main lesson of the Wonsan Operation is that no so-called subsidiary 
branch of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be 
neglected or related to such a minor role in the future.27 
24Kelso, Frank B. II., CNO, "Meeting The Challenges of an Uncertain World," Mine 
Warfare Plan. 29 January 1992, p. 18. 
25Hartmann, p. 78. 
26Hartmann, p. 78. 
27 
'Cagle, MW. and Manson, F.A., p. 136. 
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A mix of 1904 and 1908 Russian vintage mines claimed 92 lives, sank and 
damaged several minesweepers, and kept 50,000 men and a 250 ship amphibious force 
stalled until vital sea lanes were cleared.28 This was done by "a nation without a navy, 
using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth 
of Christ."29 
F.  VIETNAM WAR 
1.  Haiphong Harbor 
On 8 May 1972, attack aircraft from the USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) dropped 36 
magnetic-acoustic mines in Haiphong harbor. The raid lasted only two minutes, but all 
shipping was stopped immediately.30 The raid was followed by the airborne mining of 
North Vietnam's coast and harbors with the intent of pressuring Hanoi to negotiate an end 
to the Vietnam War. According to Kissenger, "The decision was based, in part, on the 
recognition of the high leverage but low confrontational risk the action would have."31 
President Nixon ordered the re-mining of the harbor as negotiations in Paris for the 
release of American prisoners of war stalled. The results were dramatic: none of the 
nations trading with Hanoi risked steaming their merchant ships into the American 
minefields. Also, the mining campaign, in conjunction with air attacks against North 
Vietnam's land lines of communication, severely curtailed the supply of vital munitions 
to North Vietnam's "Easter Offensive." 
28Melia, p. 78. 
29Admiral Sherman, CNO, summation of the dilemma facing the U.S. Navy in 1950, 
cited from Melia, p. 151. 
30The international acceptance of the U.S. mine blockade of Haiphong Harbor during 
the Vietnam conflict has established a legal precedent for such mine blockades. In that 
instance, it was argued effectively that all significant requirements for a blockade were 
established. 
31Kissenger, Henry, White House Years, 1979, p. 1179. 
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Strategically and tactically, the mining campaign was a tremendous success, but 
equally important to the U.S. planners were the lessons learned from the arduous 
minesweeping operation, named "Operation End Sweep." Operation End Sweep proved 
that minesweeping, either by aircraft or by surface ship, was not by itself the answer to 
the tedious task of clearing mines. If a similar situation were to arise today, a RECO 
capability would alleviate the arduous job of sweeping the minefield by simply turning 
the minefield off or self-destructing it. 
G.  DESERT STORM 
1.  Persian Gulf War 
The Iraqi Navy's use of mines during the Gulf War is an excellent case of an 
inferior navy mounting a credible threat against a vastly superior opponent. By 
conducting a well-planned, although poorly executed, mining operation, the Iraqis turned 
their mining campaign into a strategic advantage. Not only did they effectively protect 
their seaward flank against planned amphibious assaults, but they also won a public 
relations victory of sorts by damaging two U.S. Navy combatants. 
February 18, 1991, brought a graphic example of the damage potential associated 
with a mine strike. The USS Tripoli (LPH-10) became Desert Storm's first mine victim, 
when she struck a LUGM-145 "cheeseburger" style mine. Tripoli lost one-third of her 
JP-5 fuel, and flooded over 271,000 gallons of water. The mine blew a gaping 20 x 16ft 
hole in her hull, costing $4 million dollars to repair. The USS Princeton became the next 
mine victim on the same day, when she detonated a 375 lb Italian-made Manta magnetic- 
acoustic influence mine. The damage to the Princeton was estimated at over $15 million 
dollars and she spent the remainder of the war being repaired. 
The U.S. fleet that concentrated for Desert Storm ultimately numbered more than 
160 ships, i.e., the largest force deployed since World War II. Six carrier battle groups, 
two battleship surface action groups, four amphibious groups, numerous surface 
combatant escorts, and 13 submarines were employed to help defeat Saddam Hussein. 
Of the more than 540,000 American troops, only 700 (0.13 percent) were naval MCM 
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forces. An equally astonishing fact is that "more than 90 percent of everything that went 
to Saudi Arabia and the Kuwaiti theater of operations went by surface vessel."32 This 
amplifies the critical need for an increased emphasis on U.S. mine warfare strategy and 
tactics. The mine threat was not only verified by Desert Storm observations, but was 
found to be greater than initially anticipated in terms of the toughness, sophistication, and 
quantities of the mines and obstacles deployed by Iraq. The only factors that prevented 
U.S. casualties of tragic proportion were the poor quality and unreliability of the majority 
of Iraqi mines; and the decision to forego the amphibious assault.33 
H.  LESSONS RE-LEARNED FROM DESERT STORM 
In November of 1991, then Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett stated: 
...The Persian Gulf has taught us more than a couple of lessons recently 
about our neglect. As we operate more and more in confined, coastal 
waters, and as scenarios requiring over-the-horizon amphibious assaults 
become more probable, we will be confronted increasingly with cheap and 
widely available mines. I, for one, have no intention of seeing the Navy 
someday forced to tell the President that we can't do the job because we're 
unable to defeat the enemy's mines.34 
While General Schwarzkopf's unwillingness to permit an amphibious landing 
revealed shortcomings in shallow water MCM, Desert Storm also illustrated the lack of 
an effective offensive MCM strategy, as two frontline surface ships were seriously 
damaged by mines that were laid freely by the Iraqis. The USS Princeton and the USS 
Tripoli incidents echoed the Navy's worst experience of the 1987-88 Persian Gulf conflict 
32Kelso, Frank B. II., CNO, "The United States in Desert Shield/Desert Storm," 15 
May 1991, pp. 28-30. 
33Naval Research Advisory Committee Report (NRAC), "Countermine Capabilities 
for Amphibious Operations (Phase II)," Jan 1992, p. 9. 
34Garrett, H. Lawrence ILL, Remarks to the Surface Navy Association, 6 November 
1991, cited in Melia, p. 129. 
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(Operation Earnest Will), when the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) was nearly sunk by 
a mine. 
Mine countermeasures operations in the Persian Gulf were carried out by the ships 
and aircraft of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, as well as the United States. Although, a relatively small number of mines was 
planted in the Persian Gulf, it was more than enough to inflict serious psychological and 
physical damage to two U.S. ships, and force the United States to change its tactical battle 
plans. The USS Princeton and USS Tripoli incidents demonstrated the cost of an 
inadequate mine warfare strategy. In addition, according to Navy officials, inadequate 
intelligence information regarding the extent of Iraqi mining in the Gulf and the danger 
it presented, forced 117 ships to anchor at Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, unwilling to 
sail further in the Gulf due to concern about mines.35 
On 12 June 1991, Supreme Allied Commander of Operation Desert Storm, General 
Norman Schartzkopf, had the following to say to the Senate Armed Service Committee 
when asked about the value of mine warfare during the Persian Gulf War: 
It had a serious impact on our capability to conduct certain types of 
operations, and that's the capability that we just must have in the future if 
we are going to conduct amphibious operations. 
35Galatowitsch, Sheila, "Undersea Mines Grow Smarter and Deadlier," Defence 
Electronics, March 1991, p. 57. 
26 
I.  SUMMARY 
This chapter illustrates the significance a minefield, or the threat of one, has had 
on naval battles throughout history. The United States has been a victim of many mine 
warfare lessons of the past, but has failed to fully acknowledge its shortcomings. 
Mine warfare improvement plans have repeatedly been published in recent years, 
but "few have been fully carried out, or significantly bartered away over time."36 An 
attempt at remedying the mine warfare dilemma is depicted in the 1994-95 U.S. Navy 
Mine Warfare Plan, which includes: 
1) developing a clandestine mine surveillance, reconnaissance, and detection 
capability, to detect the numerous "indicators" that an aggressor displays 
prior to the employment of mines. This is the top priority, and at the core 
of effective offensive MCM. 
2) developing an all-source intelligence data base that will monitor ongoing 
mine research, development, and technologies throughout the world. 
3) developing a command-control-communications-computers and intelligence 
(C4I) capability. 
4) integrating mine warfare with amphibious warfare. 
5) developing naval mines and the doctrine and tactics for their use in 
offensive and defensive operations in future conflicts.37 
36Melia, Tamara M., "Mine Warfare Languishing," The Navy Times, 15 November 
1993, p. 30. 
371994 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 25. 
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IV.  THE PROLIFERATION OF MINES AND MINE TECHNOLOGY38 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the technological advances mines have made over the past 
few years, as well as the threat associated with the proliferation of mines and mine 
technology. Included in this chapter is a list of the countries that are known to make and 
or export mines. An list of the companies that make up the mine industry is included to 
give an appreciation for the wide spread corporate involvement. Also, the proliferation 
of mine technology, which can make a mine "look" different to countermeasure forces, 
has complicating the already arduous task of clearing a minefield. As the world wrestles 
with the problem of controlling the proliferation of mines and mine technologies, the 
United States must pursue its own strategic measures to deter the threat of mines in future 
conflicts. 
B. THE PROBLEM 
The reorientation of the U.S. National Military Strategy from global to regional 
conflict and the concurrent shift of U.S. naval doctrine from open ocean to littoral warfare 
substantially increased the importance of amphibious operations and mine warfare in 
relation to other warfare areas.39 Mines have been the weapon of choice for many 
developing countries and may, in a regional context, prove to be the ultimate conventional 
deterrent.   The problem facing the United States is that the proliferation of mines and 
38Much of the information and analysis contained in this chapter, relating to the 
proliferation of mines and mine technology was obtained in part from a unclassified thesis 
done by Daniel M. Green, LT, USN, at the Naval Postgraduate School, December 1993, 
entitled, Monitoring Technology Proliferation: An Open Source Methodology for 
Generating Proliferation Intelligence, pp. 68-84. 
39Department of the Navy, ...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st 
Century, September 1992. 
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mine technologies is advancing rapidly, and mine countermeasures technology simply has 
not kept pace. 
Underwater mines and associated technology have traditionally been very slow to 
develop and even slower to become obsolete. Contact mine technology that developed 
at the turn of the 20th century will still be a viable threat in the 21st century.40 The 
current weapon inventories of many Third World countries consist of mines produced 
shortly after World War II.41 A review of high-tech applications currently being 
incorporated into mines, however, indicates that mines are rapidly evolving into 
sophisticated weapon systems. Microprocessors, sonar systems, non-metallic construction 
materials, unique architectural designs, absorptive coatings, advanced sensors, anti- 
swimmer devices, remote actuation, and propulsion and guidance systems are being 
incorporated into the newest generations of mines. 
A related technological development of particular concern to those decision makers 
responsible for evaluating specific regional threats, is the introduction of modular upgrade 
kits that can be retrofitted to existing mine warstocks. These kits replace a mine's firing 
circuits with modern electronics, turning relatively simple underwater ordnance into 
computer controlled, multiple sensor "smart" weapons. 
The ability to retrofit existing warstock mines with a microprocessing "brain" has 
several major implications for mine and littoral warfare. First, force packages and 
strategies used to counter mines depend on the type (bottom or moored), and the 
activation device (magnetic, acoustic, or pressure). And secondly, the external 
identification of the mine is no longer a valid indicator of a mine's capabilities.42 
40In 1987 and 1988 respectively, the U.S. flagged oil tanker Bridgeton and the USS 
Samuel B. Roberts struck contact mines that were of pre-World War I design (Mk08). 
41
 Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems 1993-1994, Jane's Information Group Ltd., 
1993, p. 170. 
42 1994 Mine Warfare Plan, 1992, p. 31. 
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These upgrade kits are a potential risk because they are currently being offered for 
export by several companies on the international market. Therefore, previously purchased 
unsophisticated mines have the capability of being technologically upgraded. Even 
contact mines can be upgraded with simple kits that transform the mine into a multiple 
sensor device. 
1.  The Mine Market 
For the purpose of this study, the 1994-95 Mine Warfare Plan is used to highlight 
the areas of mine warfare that need immediate attention. 
The Mine Warfare Plan approaches the threat posed by underwater mine 
proliferation from the aspect of national mine production and export activity. It states 
that "currently, 48 world navies are estimated to have some degree of mine warfare 
capability, 27 countries have a mine manufacturing capability and 20 are known exporters 
of naval mines."43 The 1992 Mine Warfare Plan offers a thorough listing of mine 
producing countries, although, only 16 countries that produce mines are cited. These 
countries are listed in Table 1. 
CHILE NORTH KOREA 
CHINA RUSSIA 




ITALY UNITED KINGDOM 
JAPAN YUGOSLAVIA 
Table 1: Mine Producing Countries (Source: 1992 Mine Warfare Plan) 
43 1994 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 21. 
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An interesting note is that 11 of the 16 nations are either allies or friends with the 
United States. Of the others, one (Yugoslavia), no longer exists as a nation-state, two 
(Russia and China), have improving relations with the United States, and another (Iraq), 
is currently controlled by United Nations sanctions and restrictions. At this time there 
is only one country, North Korea, that produces mines and is hostile to the United States. 
By including non-enemies in this analysis, the Mine Warfare Plan highlights one 
of the unique aspects of a post-Cold War threat evaluation. The national security 
establishment can no longer focus on potentially hostile nations exclusively but most 
contend with potentially hostile environments. Any actor operating in this environment 
must be considered a potential threat. 
Based on the assumption that proliferation is primarily a function of corporate not 
government activity, several companies were determined to make up the mine industry. 
The following companies are advertised producers of naval mines and parts or have been 
involved in some form of underwater mine production during the ten year period 1983- 
1993. (See Appendix B). Compiling lists of companies is one way of evaluating the 
threat posed by the proliferation of mines and their associated technologies. More 
importantly, it emphasizes the growing threat posed by all types of mines. 
C.  SUMMARY 
Mines are a low cost, conventional deterrent that may prove decisive to the 
outcome of limited regional or littoral warfare. The ability to upgrade existing warstock 
mines to microprocessor controlled, multiple sensor, "smart weapon" systems significantly 
alters the strategy used to plan certain military operations. Therefore, accurate 
intelligence gathering measures to track mine proliferation and technologies are essential 
to a successful MCM strategy. Intelligence gathering must concentrate on "threat 
technologies," i.e., those technologies that directly challenge the superiority of existing 
military weapons and systems. Underwater mine upgrade kits are an example of high 
technology that enhance the sophistication of a mine and reaffirm the vital importance of 
possessing a U.S. mine warfare strategy centered around "pro-active" tactics. 
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V.  THE ART OF MINE WARFARE 
Clearly, our ability to conduct effective mine countermeasures and to 
employ mines when it is in our interest to do so will be critical for the 
success of future naval operations.44 
Admiral Frank B. Kelso II 
Chief of Naval Operations 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the strategic advantages and disadvantages of an integrated 
offensive mining and mine defense strategy. Specifically, it is proposed that the U.S. 
Navy exploit RECO capabilities and embrace a pro-active, offensive MCM strategy, the 
objective being the deterrence of enemy mine laying and hence the security of U.S. 
control of the sea. 
B. THE CONCEPT 
Mining is not a "stand-alone" strategy, but one that is most effective when used 
in conjunction with other strategic and tactical operations. An offensive minefield can 
be deployed in an area of high tensions, prior to or during hostilities that could force the 
enemy to make one or all of the following decisions: 
1) mount an extensive, time consuming effort to clear the minefield; 
2) challenge the field and accept the casualties; and 
3) use the waters which are "believed" to be clear of the mines. 
^Kelso, Frank B. II, CNO,  "Building Blocks of Naval Power," Proceedings, 
November 1992, p. 44. 
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1.  The Advantages of Mining 
Stress and uncertainty lie at the heart of mine warfare. In the past, the 
psychological impact of a minefield has often overshadowed its physical threat. The 
mine's value lies not just in the damage it inflicts on shipping, but also in the fact that 
the suspected presence of a minefield can suffice to bring shipping to a halt. Operators 
need to be reasonably certain that it is safe for shipping to move. Therefore, the 
psychological damage is quite often the greatest gain of a mining effort. The 
minesweeping effort necessary for "safe" passage can create important strategic delays. 
Insurance companies increase premiums to cover the added risk, and crewman balk at 
sailing in waters that may be mined. The recent technological advances in mines have 
made it extremely difficult to provide reasonable assurances of safe passage. 
Minefields are like twilight zones - they work more on human minds than on the 
ships themselves. As Bartholomew and Greer put it: "We must use our knowledge and 
exaggerated fears of the unknown to our advantage, and explore mine warfare's full 
psychological potential."45 The mine's ability to create fear of the unknown is generally 
overlooked by naval officers and planners. Instead, the number of disabled ships is 
commonly cited as the indicator of the weapon's effectiveness. Yet, less obvious but 
equally decisive in the outcome of battles are all the ships that never went in harm's way, 
never became disabled, and never contributed to disabling anything else. The more a 
minefield controls a ship's movement, the greater the minefield's effectiveness. 
The psychological threat of a minefield can be strategically significant. Its success 
is not necessarily measured by the number of enemy ships sunk, but rather by the 
constraining impact it has on enemy plans and movements. A minefield is successful if 
enemy ships are delayed, diverted, or kept from using strategically significant bodies of 
water. Minefields achieve that goal principally through the opponent's perception of the 
threat they pose to his shipping.   The fact that mines can sink ships makes their threat 
45Bartholomew, James and Greer, William., "The Psychology of Mine Warfare," 
Proceedings, February 1986, p. 58. 
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credible. But the real effect of a minefield comes from the more subtle influence of an 
exaggerated fear. This may be true for other weapons as well, but it is especially so for 
mines. 
The psychological threat of the mine emanates from the uncertainty it creates and, 
secondly, from the fear of the dire consequences if the threat proves to be underrated. 
Minefields are unique in the fact that they cannot be engaged in combat like other enemy 
forces. A minefield lies quietly, revealing itself only when engaged. The detonation of 
one mine gives no assurance that the field is clear of danger and gives virtually no 
information about the presence of other mines. If anything, it confirms the presence of 
a "hidden threat." Mining is distinguished from other naval operations in that it 
frequently offers an opportunity to inflict severe long-term damage on the enemy while 
affording little or no chance of retaliatory action against attacking forces. Minefields 
offer the unique possibility of setting up a preemptive defense in which the aggressor 
must take full responsibility for the casualties he suffers. Mining permits enemy shipping 
to be attacked without the necessity for the delivery vehicle to engage or even to locate 
the target, so that the smallest minelayer may indirectly destroy the most powerful 
warships. The mine may also offer the advantage of covertness and surprise; the first 
indication of its presence may be detonation. Even if not covert, mining offers the 
advantage of concealment; it offers no visible warning of danger, and its exact location 
is for all practical purposes unknown. 
Naval mines, whether used offensively or defensively have the following unique 
characteristics: 
1) they are relatively cheap weapons, typically costing less than $20,000; 
2) they are universal weapons that are easy to acquire on the world's arms 
market.  The same is true for mine "upgrade" kits; 
3) they are clandestine weapons that incite terror and intimidation; 
4) they are weapons that wait and pose little return threat to the mine layer; 
5) they are passive weapons that can cause an enemy to change his tactics; 
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6) they are a constraining weapon, so that enemy shipping may be attacked 
more easily by other weapons; 
7) they can delay naval operations; 
8) they are a continuing menace to moral, and their psychological attributes 
may be subtle, but are not taken lightly by commanders and decision 
makers who evaluate the associated risks involved; 
9) they offer warfighting leverage, they are force multipliers that produce 
significant advantages as "trump cards."46 
C.  OFFENSIVE MINING: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR THE FUTURE 
Offensive minefields are planted in enemy controlled or in disputed waters. Under 
certain circumstances, offensive mining in massive numbers early in a conflict may 
disrupt an enemy's ability to execute his war plans, more effectively than any other naval 
weapon. Also, the use of mines to constrain enemy ships in safe waters would make the 
latter more susceptible to attack by other forces. A long-term advantages of offensive 
mining is the fact that after successful mining has been achieved, either in previous 
conflict or the present conflict, the simple threat of mining may be all that is necessary 
to achieve effective results. 
The U.S. Navy used limited offensive mining during Desert Storm in the hope of 
isolating Iraqi naval vessels, predominantly fast patrol craft, at their bases. A single 
mining mission was conducted at the mouth of the Khawr Az-Zubayr River, a choke-point 
through which most of the Iraqi Navy would have to pass on its way to the Gulf. The 
strike involved a total of 18 carrier aircraft, with four A-6E's laying 42 MK 36 mines (six 
others failed to release from an aircraft) at the expense of one A-6E.47 The operation was 
not a critical factor in the Navy's success during Operation Desert Storm, although a 
46 1992 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 29. 
""Department of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, pp. 193- 
194. 
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offensive mining campaign aimed at preventing the Iraqi's from laying mines in the early 
phases of the conflict might have brought different results. 
D.  REMOTE CONTROLLED (RECO) MINES 
RECO mines offer the United States a political bargaining advantage as well as 
a tactical naval advantage that is truly unique. Controlled mines are not new perse. In 
1878, with the help of Army engineering General, H.L. Abbot, the United States was the 
first to designed the remote control mine, specifically for the defense of harbors. The 
mines were primitive in comparison with today's standards, consisting of buoyant steel 
cases containing between 25 and 500 pounds of explosives. Each mine had a "hot" wire 
detonator and an electrical cable that attached to a battery on shore. A system of mines 
consisted of 5 to 10 mines whose individual cables were connected to a junction box from 
which a single multiple conductor cable was placed on shore. The main problems with 
controlled mines in those days were its unreliability and the difficulty of determining from 
a shore station when the enemy was within the damage range.48 
Modern controlled mines no longer rely on hard wiring to a nearby shore station. 
Their activation depends instead on the receipt of a coded Very Low Frequency (VLF) 
signal. VLF is currently the only satisfactory means of long-range underwater 
communications in deep water.49 Even so, the effective transmission of a coded VLF 
message remains the major obstacle facing the development of a operational RECO 
mining capability. Preliminary study indicates that an acoustically coded sonar "ping" is 
probably the most reliable and easiest way of transmitting a code.   Although the coded 
48Duncan, Robert, C, America's Use of Sea Mines, 1962, p. 33. 
49Watts, Anthony J., Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, Sixth Edition, 1994-1995, 
Jane's Information Group Limited, p. 138. 
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message to a mine could conceivably be intercepted, its complexity makes it virtually 
impossible for an opponent to duplicate it and engage in remote "countermining."50 
1.  Advantages of Remote Controlled Mines 
The placement of inactive RECO minefields prior to hostilities can overcome some 
of the difficulties inherent in commencing "conventional" minelaying operations after 
hostilities have commenced. An example of these difficulties are: first, the lack of 
available minelaying assets because of higher priority needs, second, attacks on those 
assets, and third, the possibility that enemy submarines may have been predeployed prior 
to commencement of hostilities. The most attractive advantage of RECO is that they may 
be emplaced in international waters beyond the territorial sea subject only to the 
requirement that they do not unreasonably interfere with other lawful uses of the oceans. 
The determination of what constitutes an "unreasonable interference" involves a number 
of factors which include: the rationale for their emplacement, extent of the area to be 
mined, the hazard to other lawful ocean uses, and the duration of their emplacement.51 
All factors that RECO could justify in a strategy aimed at deterrence. Because remote 
controlled mines do not constitute a hazard to navigation, international notice of their 
emplacement is not required.52 
RECO mines would allow the U.S to de-escalate from a highly threatening posture 
by simply turning them off. Thereby, eliminating the requirement to sterilize or scuttle 
extremely expensive minefields. This could also prove to be an effective deterrent if an 
opponent had ideas of re-escalating a conflict. 
The preemptive deployment of RECO mines can also be used to deter an opponent 
from initiating a mining campaign.  If an opponent were to use another nation to aid in 
50Telephone interview with Victor Newton, a mine expert from the Coastal System 
Station at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Silver Springs, MD, 21 November 1994. 
51NWP 9, Chapter 9, Paragraph 9.2.2, p. 9-5. 
52NWP 9, p. 9-5, emphasis added. 
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mine laying operations, RECO could be used as a "blockade" to restrict the flow of 
shipping to a given port, thus denying the opponent economic exchange. Offensive 
mining with RECO mines would not only give the United States a tactical advantage if 
forces are to be projected ashore, but would also convey U.S. resolve in a situation while 
avoiding the active use of military force. The ability to turn a minefield on or off could 
give the United States an added strategic advantage which may be especially useful at an 
early stage of a conflict. Because the evolution and termination of a conflict is often 
uncertain, the conventionally armed mines may not be laid in time (due to the "other" 
priority requirements of available assets during a crisis) to achieve their full effect, 
especially since the delayed activation and scuttling features of the mine need to be 
preset. RECO can solve this dilemma by deferring these requirements until the decision 
whether or not to arm is made. 
For a relatively modest investment in research and development funds, various 
types of remote control could be developed and tested to the maximum safety standards. 
The technology was proven effective in the 1980s by White Oak Mine Laboratory, and 
by increasing funding, as shown in Table 2 below, the United States could have RECO 
capability available in FY98. 
Appropriations                  FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 
RDT&E                            3.5 9.0 15.0 3.0 0 0 
Other Procurement, Navy - llllSP •l|f||l§ 5.0 10.0 10.0 
-   Quantity llStPli? Willis 300 700 700 
* ALL NUMBERS IN MILLIONS 
Table 2: Funding Required for RECO (Source: Mine Warfare / EOD Branch) 
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2.  Disadvantages of Remote Controlled Mines 
The laying of "inactive" RECO mines in the high seas during periods of increased 
tension could possibly escalate the level of tension in certain situations, although it would 
set a long term precedent for future adversaries to consider prior to initiating a mining 
campaign. Also, mining with "unarmed" mines prior to hostilities could possibly incur 
protests from the maritime community because of the fear associated with inadvertent 
actuation. 
E.  IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OF FOE FOR MINEFIELDS (IFFM) 
IFFM is a beneficial, although not an essential, ingredient for the offensive 
minefields of the future. Its primary benefit is that it will safeguard friendly shipping that 
ventures into the minefield, whether accidentally or because of tactical necessity. The 
technology involved is conceptually similar to that used by aircraft, and basically enables 
the mine to "look" at a passing ship and determine whether it is friendly or foe. IFFM 
would be beneficial in the following situations: 
1) navigation and maneuver problems that may arise from operational 
constraints or simply mechanical difficulties. 
2) if tactically necessary, it will allow a friendly ship or submarine to 
sail into a friendly minefield without setting off the mines. 
3) its primary purpose is to enhance platform maneuver safety in the 
vicinity of own minefields. 
IFFM is intended for combatants as an additional safeguard that will also facilitate 
mining. The one-on-one interrogation of IFFM provides a ship with real-time 
maneuvering freedom. A prerequisite is that the platform be equipped with an IFFM 
transponder or transmitter whose emitting signal or "squawk" will tell the mine whether 
the passing ship is friend or foe. 
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1.  IFFM Tagging 
"Tagging" enemy ships to emit a foe-code is a system design option for IFFM that 
has been studied as an alternative to U.S. ships emitting a friend-code.53 Using this 
option, the mines will only fire on transistors that emit a foe-code. Obviously, the extent 
of successful mining using foe-code IFFM will depend on the ability to tag the foe ahead 
of time. It may be possible to covertly tag a number of clearly identifiable platforms, 
such as enemy submarines, but a large-scale tagging operation would probably not be 
practical. 
54 F.  GENERIC MINING SITUATIONS 
The following "scenarios" suggest how a RECO mine capability, combined with 
IFFM, may be tactically used to deter or combat an opponent. 
1.  Deferred Activation and Early Termination 
While current mines can be set for an active time cycle using delayed activation 
and eventual deactivation, a decision about the timing must be made before the mines are 
made ready for planting. Uncertainty about when to de-activate can hamper the effective 
use of mines, and prevent them from being used as a viable option. 
On the other hand, RECO can turn the minefield on or off when desired thereby 
removing reservations about laying mines that stem from uncertainties about the 
development of the conflict and the movement of U.S. platforms. RECO, therefore, has 
strategic implications because it allows the Navy to benefit from the potentially high 
53Dence, W., "Report on Possible Implementation Schemes for IFF for Minefields 
(IFFM)," Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Memorandum, 21 Oct 
1992. 
54The following "Generic Mining Situations" were studied by the Surface ASW 
and Mines Analysis Office of the Warfare Analysis Department at the Naval Surface 
Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division. This report documents an assessment made in 
support of Mine Warfare Block research of implementation schemes for Identification 
Friend or Foe (IFF) for minefields. The assessment was sponsored by the Office of 
Naval Research (ONR-T 4533). 
41 
political and military utility of mines in situations where other means may be too 
aggressive and where the lack of a RECO capability might preclude the use of mines 
altogether. An obvious tactical benefit of RECO is that the mines can be laid to 
accommodate the availability; and the activation of a minefield can be deferred until a 
decision to do so is made. 
The need to lay the mines covertly is another mission requirement that RECO can 
meet because of the lead time this capability provides a battle group commander in 
choosing a platform and the time frame, which best suit his operational requirements. 
Typically, a period of increased tensions proceeds the outbreak of hostilities, and 
during this period a peaceful settlement through diplomatic negotiations is still a 
possibility. However, in order to prepare for the eventuality of war, as well as to back 
up the negotiations, forces and supplies may be required to be lifted to the area. During 
this vulnerable build-up period, the arriving reinforcements and supplies must be 
protected.  Defensive RECO minefields can serve as one form of self-protection. 
At the conclusion of a conflict, when the United States must clear its own mines, 
RECO can be highly useful in not only protecting MCM forces, but also in detonating the 
mines if needed. IFFM could also be used to re-locate the mines for future use. In 
Vietnam, the Navy was eventually tasked with clearing thousands of mines in Haiphong 
harbor, an operation that ultimately, because of the loss of two helicopters, cost about 
twice as much as laying the mines.55 In the future, an alternative method of clearing U.S. 
mines is extremely important for the simple fact that it eliminates any risk to U.S. forces. 
2.  Flank Protection Mining 
Flank mining, i.e., the protection of a given area or forcing an enemy into an area 
that is strategically advantageous to the United States, can also include traffic 
channelization and Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) protection. The ultimate objective 
of these types of mining operations is the protection of U.S. traffic and military operations 
55Kelso, Frank B. II., CNO,  "Building Blocks of Naval Power," Proceedings, 
November 1992, p. 41. 
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from hostile platforms. Flank mining can channel merchant traffic to check points that 
allow U.S. platforms to intercept enemy submarines and surface combatants, and in effect, 
gain the tactical advantage. The five month build-up of allied forces prior to the Gulf 
War is suggestive of how minefields could have been useful in protecting the local Sea 
Lanes Of Communication (SLOC), especially if the threat had included submarines. 
Minefields for flank protection are most effective when they put a threat platform 
beyond its tactically useful range of operations. The separation must also leave space for 
friendly ASW operations between the minefield and the SLOC channel in case enemy 
platforms penetrate. The mines must be laid so as to preclude blue-on-blue (friendly) 
encounters, so that the ships can operate within their bounds. The possible situations that 
could place U.S. ships near the mines are: 
1) faulty navigation; 
2) maneuver problems; 
3) drifting to minimize noise; 
4) taking up flank station for air defense; and 
5) chasing enemy surface or subsurface platforms 
In February 1991, the USS Princeton (CG-59) and the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) were 
damaged by Iraqi mines while on station off the coast of Kuwait. The USS Princeton 
carried the AAW Commander for an MCM task group and continued to operate in the 
area after receiving U.S. intelligence estimates about Iraqi minefields.56 This clearly 
demonstrates that the Navy is ready to accept mine related risks in order to succeed in 
its mission. It is clear that U.S. ships, on occasion, may not have the option of staying 
well clear of U.S. mines, and uncertainty about the location of the mines will undoubtedly 
complicate the decision of pursuing the mission.  Although, it is obviously tragic to hit 
56 Melia, pp. 128-129. 
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a mine, it is especially so if one's own mine is the culprit.   In such situations, IFFM 
would significantly lower this risk. 
3. Port and Naval Base Closure Mining 
This mission is clearly offensive and would probably not be utilized until after a 
conflict has begun. In the Persian Gulf War, the United States mined the Iraqi port and 
naval base at Umm Qasr a few days after the shooting war began.57 A benefit of closing 
down a port with mines instead of bombing the port facilities is that it not only leaves the 
port intact but is a far more humanitarian and cost-effective solution. RECO would make 
it possible for U.S. ships to enter the port without having to wait for the mines to be 
cleared. The U.S. could then immediately use the port for strategic purposes or to bring 
in its own supplies in order to conduct relief operations, etc. IFFM would act as an 
added safety feature for those ships configured with it. 
4. Coastal Water ASW Mining 
The threat posed by coastal submarines and the unpredictable acoustic conditions 
in shallow waters combine to make mines a potentially effective complement to enemy 
surface and submarine forces. By stretching minelines seaward from the shoreline, enemy 
submarines hugging the coast would be intercepted or forced out into deeper waters where 
other U.S. forces could better prosecute them. With the employment of this tactic, IFFM 
would be highly useful in allowing U.S. platforms the option of chasing or luring the 
enemy into the minefield. 
G.  OFFENSIVE MINING SUMMARY 
It appears, based on a qualitative assessment of projected benefits and limitations, 
that RECO and IFFM while overlapping somewhat have significantly different 
implications. RECO may be more significant in enabling mining to be employed and 
IFFM has its greatest utility in safeguarding friendly ships operating close to their own 
57Kelso, Frank. B. II, CNO,  "Building Blocks of Naval Power," Proceedings, 
November 1992, p. 41. 
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mines. Therefore, IFFM can also facilitate tactical mining. The operationally ideal 
solution, from a strategic as well as safety standpoint, would be a combination of the two. 
The U.S. Navy learned some valuable mine warfare lessons from Desert Storm, 
although the actual funding required to remedy these problems has taken a back-seat to 
more "important" programs. The Navy has been especially delinquent with respect to its 
rapidly dwindling mining capabilities.58 
Given the high leverage that offensive and defensive mining provides, it 
is surprising that there are no mine development programs ongoing in the 
U.S. Navy.59 
Although all three of the Navy's warfare "communities" (surface, air, subsurface) 
have a mine laying capability, none has embraced the mine as its "own." Of the money 
appropriated to mining programs - which represents less than 1% of the Navy's total 
obligated authority - offensive mine programs receive less than 10% of mine warfare 
funding, while less than 2% is invested in mine research and development.60 
Warfare in regional conflicts requires systems that, besides producing the 
necessary threat, also produce the flexibility needed when a battle plan shifts and the 
political and operational direction of a conflict changes. This has been the case in recent 
conflicts and will undoubtedly be the case in future littoral warfare.  Therefore, the 
58This point was emphasized by Edward Zdankiewicz, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy (Mine and Undersea Warfare), during a September 1993 briefing to a 
National Security Industrial Association Mine Warfare Conference, cited in 
Proceedings, October 1994, p. 44. 
59Keller, Stephen H., "What Weapons That Wait," Proceedings, October 1994, p. 
44. 
60Keller, p. 44. 
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capability to control U.S. minefields and assure safe shipping passage by turning whole 
segments on or off, will be strategically significant in future mine related conflicts. 
H.  OFFENSIVE   PRO-ACTIVE" MINE COUNTERMEASURES 
There exist several methods that the Unites States could employ to more 
effectively prevent an aggressor from laying mines before and during a conflict. 
Ultimately, if the United States can successfully prevent an aggressor from laying mines, 
it will eventually deter these acts of aggression from taking place. The following methods 
illustrate how accurate intelligence gathering, coupled with a strong U.S. policy, can 
signal resolve. 
1.  Deterrence 
The mission of all U.S. military forces is to deter aggression and, should 
deterrence fail, to engage and defeat the aggressor in armed conflict so as to restore 
international peace and security. In order to deter aggression, U.S. military forces must 
be both capable and ready, and must be perceived to be so by potential aggressors. 
Equally important is the perception of other nations that, should the need arise, the U.S. 
has the will to use its forces in individual or collective self-defense.61 
Deterrence is a "state-of-mind" brought about by a credible threat of retaliation and 
the deterree's conviction that the action being contemplated cannot succeed, or his belief 
that the costs of the action will exceed any possible gains. Thus, the aggressor is 
reluctant to act for fear of failure, costs, or both. The presence of naval forces to a crisis 
area is one of the strongest deterrent signals the United States can send. It is are 
unequivocal evidence that a fully combat-ready force stands poised to protect U.S. 
national interests. If the United States is not able to effectively deter an aggressor, or if 
an aggressor questions U.S. resolve in a given situation, that resolve may be displayed 
through the use of force, thus pushing the United States into military action. 
61National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, January 1988, 
pp. 3-4 and 13-14, cited in NWP 9, p. 4-7. 
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Deterrence...does not exist in abstract isolation; it arises from a hypothesis, 
however conditional or remote, of actual use.62 
If a mine threat were to arise, the United States must be ready to deter it. In 
support of the principle that aggression will not pay, U.S. military forces may have to be 
used and they must be ready to undertake the effort quickly and successfully. Though 
no one cannot predict or stop all uses of force, the United States can effectively deter 
most. The price of being able to do that - the price of deterrence - is political will, 
credible military capabilities, and constant vigilance. The United States can no longer 
afford to react to an aggressor's use of mines. Instead, it must aggressively pursue 
strategic and tactical alternatives that deter the enemy from using mines. After all, the 
only really effective counter to mines is their prevention. 
2.  Attacking the Problem 
An excellent example of a truly "pro-active" strategy was seen during the 1987-88 
Iran-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf. Despite the protests from Iran that its vessels were not 
laying mines, U.S. intelligence assets tracked the Iranian landing craft, Iran Ajr, from its 
port in Iran to an area north of Qatar in September 1987. A helicopter from the frigate, 
USS Jarrett (FFG-33), using night-vision cameras, detected minelaying activity aboard 
the vessel and observed the crew laying at least six mines. It then fired on the ship. 
After a short time the Iran Air resumed minelaying, and the helicopter opened fire again. 
At daybreak a boarding party captured the vessel with nine mines aboard. The publicity 
surrounding this event effectively halted Iranian minelaying for six months. The boarding 
party also recovered charts marked with minefields planted that night, allowing MCM 
forces to clear the field.63   Intelligence during this war was critical to the successful 
62Quinlan, Michael, "Nuclear Weapons and the Abolition of War," Journal of 
International Affairs, April 1991, p. 31. 
63Giusti, James R., "Sweeping the Gulf," Surface Warfare, March-April 1988. The 
contact mines captured aboard the Iranian Ajr may have been Russian supplied from 
North Korean stock. 
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interception of the Iranian minelayer, and it allowed the United States to demonstrate an 
unquestionable commitment to the safe passage of innocent vessels. This is a tactic the 
United States needs to embrace, not only for the overall security and safe passage of 
innocent commercial and naval vessels, but in support of U.S. naval operations. The 
implications of not countering vessels laying mines in international waters could be 
disastrous. Desert Storm is proof that if a minelayer is allowed to freely lay mines the 
consequences could be severe. 
3. The Use of Special Operations 
The employment of special operation forces for intelligence gathering missions 
could expose many strategic and tactical enemy elements and is one of the most highly 
valued missions of special operators. The information gathered concerning enemy mine 
transfers, manufacturing warehouses, logistical infrastructure, and minefield location and 
type, would be of critical concern to the overall success of U.S. operations.64 
During the 1987-88 Iran-Iraq War, the United States used the expertise of special 
operators and staff officers who served on mobile support bases in Vietnam (Joint Task 
Force Middle East) to transform two mobile oil platforms into Mobile Sea Barges in an 
effort to prevent minelaying. The Iran-Iraq War proved that the prevention of minelaying 
is a joint service operation and one of the most important elements of an effective 
offensive mine countermeasures campaign. 
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of timely and accurate intelligence 
and the contributions special operation forces can make to the overall strategic 
effectiveness of any operation involving mine warfare. Their capabilities must be utilized 
before a crisis to fully expose the enemy's mining potential. 
4. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
The Navy has initiated a number of intelligence gathering concepts that focus on 
current operational deficiencies. The Naval Studies Board recently identified three areas 
that are of the utmost importance to a successful MCM operation.  They are: 
64 1994 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 26. 
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1) Intelligence: the activities undertaken by technical collection agencies, 
beginning in some cases before a mining crisis and continuing beyond the 
end of a contingency in which mines were used. 
2) Surveillance: sensing and reporting of land and sea activities by satellites, 
manned and unmanned vehicles, and people, and begins before mines are 
moved from storage sites to minelaying platforms, continuing throughout 
a crisis/conflict. 
3) Reconnaissance: provides the "ground truth" of mines in an area of 
interest, and contributes to operational and tactical planning.65 
Mine warfare intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance can be enhanced 
significantly through covert, clandestine operations. The overall value of this information, 
coupled with technical intelligence data, is enormous, permitting a real-time evaluation 
of the mine threat. 
The Navy has also begun to take steps to integrate attack submarines more 
completely into mine force planning and operations with the ultimate goal of expanding 
their capabilities so as to provide surveillance, reconnaissance, and detection of enemy 
mining activities. The SSNs will be aided in this role by U.S. Navy SEALs. The Air 
Force and Navy maritime patrol aircraft have also been working together to provide mine 
warehouse, logistical routes, and storage facility information through photo-intelligence 
missions.66 Unfortunately, the availability of resources for timely and effective 
surveillance remains limited. 
I.  OFFENSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES SUMMARY 
The Navy needs to develop and most importantly embrace an aggressive mine 
countermeasures strategy to prevent the laying of mines. Through a combination of 
forward basing, surveillance, patrolling, and carefully measured responses to individual 
651994 Mine Warfare Plan, pp. 47-48. 
661994 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 26. 
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situations, the United States would signal commitment and a no-nonsense approach to 
those who challenged its resolve. 
Programs such as these paint an attractive picture for the future of mine 
surveillance and reconnaissance, but the unfortunate reality is this highly sophisticated 
technology and the employment of air assets are extremely limited, and that more "vital" 
mission requirements will most probably take precedence in the future. Unfortunately, 
the fate of a mine warfare operation may well turn on the acquisition of intelligence about 
enemy mines, warehouse facilities, transporting of mines, and minefields. 
I believe there are some fundamentals about mine warfare that we should 
not forget. Once mines are laid, they are quite difficult to get rid of. That 
is not likely to change. It is probably going to get worse, because mines 
are going to become more sophisticated.67 
Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, USN 
Chief of Naval Operations 
October 1991 
67 1994 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 3. 
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VI.  RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter highlights the point that, once "armed" mines are laid the commander 
of a naval vessel is effectively, under attack. It also points out that the JCS Rules of 
Engagement (ROE), which govern an on-scene commander's actions, are vague with 
respect to the ability of the so-threatened ship to defend itself. 
U.S. rules of engagement are the means by which the National Command 
Authorities (NCA) and the U.S. military chain of command authorize subordinate 
commanders to employ military force for the self-defense of the nation and its citizens, 
and the protection of national assets worldwide. Rules of engagement delineate the 
circumstances and limitations under which U.S. naval, ground, and air forces will initiate 
and / or continue combat engagement with enemy forces.68 A principle tenet of those 
ROEs concerns the responsibility of the commander to take all necessary and appropriate 
action for his unit's self-defense.69 A commander must have the authority and capability 
to exercise the inherent right of self-defense. It should be clear that, once an "armed" 
mine has been placed in international waters, this is done with the intent to inflict 
casualties (whether physical or psychological). 
1.  The Right of Self-Defense 
The Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations enjoy the inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. U.S. doctrine on 
self-defense, set forth in the JCS Peacetime Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, 
provides that the use of force in self-defense against armed attack, or the threat of 
imminent armed attack, rests upon two elements: 
68NWP 9, paragraph 5.5, p. 5-19. 
69NWP 9, Peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE), paragraph 5.5.1, p. 5-19. 
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1) necessity, i.e., the requirement that a use of force be in response to a 
hostile act or hostile intent; and 
2) proportionality, i.e., the requirement that the use of force be in all 
circumstances limited in intensity, duration, and scope to that which is 
reasonably required to counter the attack or threat of attack and to ensure 
the continued safety of U.S. forces.70 
It should be clear that the laying of "armed" mines in international waters is 
indeed an armed attack with hostile intent that places any and all those who transit those 
waters in jeopardy. Defense against a mine-laying aggressor would be permitted within 
the established guidelines of an act of self-defense and should be permitted by the U.N. 
Charter. 
Included within the inherent right of self-defense is the right of a nation (and its 
armed forces) to protect itself against imminent attack. International law71 recognizes that 
it would be contrary to the purposes of the Charter if a threatened nation were required 
to absorb an aggressor's initial and potentially crippling first strike before taking military 
measures necessary to thwart an imminent attack. U.S. Navy Regulations and typical 
peacetime ROEs authorize an on-scene commander to shoot first when necessary for 
anticipatory self-defense of forces under his command - for example, to defend against 
a kamikaze aircraft diving on a ship in sufficient time to ward off the blow. This is 
known as unit self-defense. A ship is similarly "under attack" when a mine is placed in 
™NWP 9, paragraph, 4.3.2.2, p. 4-9. 
^International law is defined as the body of rules that nations consider binding in 
their relations with one another. International law derives from the practice of nations 
in the international arena and from international agreements. International law provides 
stability in international relations and an expectation that certain acts or omissions will 
effect predictable consequences. Nations typically comply with international law because 
it is in their best interest to do so. 
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international waters.  The outcome, if not countered, has the potential of being equally, 
if not more catastrophic for the ship and crew. 
History suggests that conflict will continue to occur in the future and U.S. forces 
will undoubtedly be called upon to help. Typically, U.S. forces will be inserted by air, 
but they will most certainly be supported from the sea. Mines, the "poor man's" option, 
will undoubtedly be used to delay U.S. forces, cause political embarrassment, and most 
importantly inflict casualties. Each of these objectives, if successful, will tend to restrict 
U.S. military and political options and ultimately impede on the U.S. ability to project 
forces ashore. 
B.  DO U.S. SHIPS HAVE TO TAKE THE FIRST HIT? 
Because one mine (or missile) may sink a ship, naval officers must ask themselves 
whether or not they have to take the first hit before a ship can react in self-defense. 
International law, Navy Regulations, and Rules of Engagement permit the use of 
force during peacetime if necessary for self-defense. The intent in each case is to restrain 
aggression, to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, and to guard against escalation if 
shooting does start. There are, however, a few circumstances where shooting first is 
permitted: 
1.  Higher Command 
Shooting first may be specifically authorized by higher command when necessary 
for anticipatory self-defense of other U.S. forces, U.S. citizens or its territory. Higher 
command rejected the use of force, in reality, self-defense, during the Persian Gulf War 
for fear of an early initiation of the war. The outcome of the failure to engage in 
anticipatory defense against Iraqi minelayers was costly. Aside from the financial cost 
of the damage ($4 million for the USS Tripoli and $15 million for the USS Princeton), 
both ships were taken out of action at a crucial point of the war. If higher command had 
embraced an offensive MCM strategy, aimed at deterring Iraqi minelayers, the mine 
warfare results of Desert Storm might have been quite different. 
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C.  MINES LAID DURING DESERT STORM 
Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, the commander of U.S. naval forces in the 
Persian Gulf, recommended in mid-December 1990, a month before operation Desert 
Storm, that the Navy begin sinking Iraqi ships that were laying mines at night in 
international waters off Kuwait. The recommendation was turned down in Washington, 
and on 18 February, Iraqi mines severely damaged two U.S. warships as they prepared 
for an amphibious assault to liberate Kuwait. Admiral Arthur, commenting on the 
interpretation of international law, stated: 
International law makes clear that persons engaged in laying mines in 
international waters are involved in an act of war. We all understood that. 
We all say we honor that. But in fact, to my knowledge, in my 
professional Navy career, we've never gone and sunk a guy laying mines 
the first shot out of the gun...We always sort of pace around the camp fire. 
So we sometimes buy ourselves into a problem by not exercising our 
right.72 
To underscore his point, Arthur noted that, were an Army commander to open up 
his tent flap and find somebody planting a land mine outside, he would shoot him.73 The 
laying of "armed" mines is in effect, a first strike by an opponent, and it should be treated 
as such. If an on-scene commander has sufficient intelligence on the laying of such 
mines in international waters, the reaction from a higher authority should be swift. It has 
been suggested that the United States failed to target the Iraqi minelayers in the early 
stages of the conflict for fear that it might trigger Iraqi retaliation against the continuing 
U.S. military build-up. Nevertheless, by permitting the Iraqi's to continue its mining 
campaign unhampered the U.S. forces jeopardized its control of the sea, and lost a 
tactical advantage. 
72Arthur, Stanley R., VADM, USN, "Fleet Commander Recommended December Hits 
on Iraqi Minelayers," Navy Times, 27 May 1992, p. 4. 
73Arthur, p. 4. 
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D.  SUMMARY 
The question that must be asked is this: is the loss of one ship and its crew to a 
mine strike an "acceptable risk?" And, can the United States afford to alter battle plans 
and tactics because the area of operations has been mined? If the answer is "No," what 
measures can the United States take to minimize the potential threat posed by an enemy 
minelayer? Desert Storm obviously taught the Navy some bitter, but valuable mine 
warfare lessons in this regard. The question is, whether the United States will 
institutionalize these lessons learned or retrace the all too familiar path that history has 
paved? 
The United States lost strategic agility in the Persian Gulf War by tacitly allowing 
the Iraqis to lay mines uncontested in the later months of Desert Shield. If the Iraqis had 
proven to be a more organized and unified fighting force, the results could have been far 
more disastrous than they turned out to be. 
Carl Von Clausewitz, the 19th Century master of strategy, warned against 
postponing action (or reaction in this case) to the point where further waiting brings a 
disadvantage upon a force. 
If the force on hand is not equal to the action contemplated and must wait 
for reinforcement past the time for action, the benefits of strategic agility 
are lost. The main feature of an offensive battle is the outflanking or by- 
passing of the defender - that is, taking the initiative.74 




VII.  A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF MINING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes how international law, the fundamental rules that nations 
consider binding in their relations with one another, addresses mining operations in time 
of peace and war. There are several international agreements which, at first glance, 
appear to impact the use of mines, however, they are primarily intended to protect neutral 
vessels and nations. This chapter primarily focuses on RECO mines and how their 
employment in international waters is within the legal limits of the international law. 
B. THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
Naval mines have been employed for area denial, coastal and harbor defense, 
antisurface and antisubmarine warfare, and blockades for years. Naval mines are lawful 
weapons, but their indiscriminate potential has led to specific regulation of their 
deployment and employment under the laws of armed conflict. The extensive and 
uncontrolled use of naval mines by both sides in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 
inflicted great damage on innocent shipping both during and long after that conflict, and 
led to Hague Convention No. VIII of 1907. The purpose of the Hague rules was to 
ensure, to the extent practicable, the safety of peaceful shipping. They required that naval 
mines be so constructed as to become harmless should they break loose from their 
moorings or otherwise cease to be under the affirmative control of the forces who laid 
them. The Hague rules also required that shipowners be warned of the presence of mines 
as soon as military conditions permitted. 
The convention was scheduled for renewal in 1914, but World War I prevented 
this, and consequently the stipulations of the original 1907 Hague Convention have never 
been updated or amended.  Technological developments have created weapons systems 
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obviously not contemplated by the drafters of these rules, but the latter remain, for all 
practical purposes, the basic international mine warfare pact in force today.75 
C.  PEACETIME MINING 
Consistent with the safety of its own citizenry, a nation may emplace both armed 
and controlled mines in its own internal waters at any time with or without notification. 
A nation may also mine its own archipelagic waters and territorial sea during peacetime 
when deemed necessary for national security purposes.76 If "armed" mines are emplaced 
in archipelagic waters or the territorial sea, appropriate international notification of the 
existence and location of such mines is required. Because the right of innocent passage 
can be suspended only temporarily, armed mines must be removed or rendered harmless 
as soon as the security threat that prompted their emplacement has terminated. 
Emplacement of controlled mines in a nation's own archipelagic waters or territorial sea 
is not subject to such notification or removal requirements. 
Armed naval mines may not be emplaced in the internal, territorial, or archipelagic 
waters of another nation in peacetime without the nation's consent. Controlled mines, 
however, may be emplaced in international waters beyond the territorial sea subject only 
to the requirement that they do not unreasonably interfere with other lawful uses of the 
oceans. The determination of what constitutes an "unreasonable interference" involves 
a balancing of a number of factors including the rationale for their emplacement (i.e., the 
self-defense requirements of the emplacing nation), the extent of the area to be mined, the 
hazard (if any) to other lawful ocean uses, and the duration of their emplacement. 
Because controlled mines do not constitute a hazard to navigation, international notice of 
their emplacement is not required. 
Armed mines may not be emplaced in international waters prior to the outbreak 
of armed conflict, except under the most demanding requirements of individual or 
75NWP 9, Chapter 9, Paragraph 9.2, p. 9-2. 
76NWP 9, p. 9-2. 
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collective self-defense. Should armed mines be emplaced in international waters under 
such circumstances, prior notification of their location must be provided and the 
anticipated date of their complete removal must be clearly stated. The nation emplacing 
armed mines in international waters during peacetime also assumes the responsibility to 
maintain an on-scene presence in the area sufficient to ensure that appropriate warning 
is provided to ships approaching the danger area. All armed mines must be expeditiously 
removed or rendered harmless when the imminent danger that prompted their 
emplacement has passed. 
D.  LEGALITY OF REMOTE CONTROLLED MINES 
Remote controlled mines greatly enhance the operational flexibility of the 
deployment and employment of naval mines prior to, at the outbreak of, and during 
hostilities.77 In the past, RECO mines were a legally contentious technology on account 
of the potential danger it posed to commercial navigation. With the use of highly 
sophisticated sensors this concern has been significantly reduced. The addition of RECO 
mines would permit the deployment of naval mines in certain areas prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities, with no need for advanced notification or demarkation of safe sea lanes until 
the mines are activated. The relevance of this type of technology is extremely timely and 
valuable, for future conflicts will give little or no time or warning of impending 
hostilities. Remote control technology gives the United States a deterrent strategy that 
will not only signal U.S. intentions and resolve but give a tactical advantage in an area 
prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities. This type of strategy is available now and 
within the legal limits of international law. 
77Legal analysis obtained from the Mine Warfare/EOD Branch, OPNAV N852, as part 
of an ongoing study for the feasibility and legality of RECO mines in the future. Cited 
from "Legal Analysis of New Technology Mines," Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
Dahlgren Division. 
59 
E.  SUMMARY 
From a legal standpoint, a "turn on - turn off" capability would remove a major 
legal impediment commonly associated with the use of naval mines. Moreover, the 
requirement for air, surface, and subsurface assets for the laying of mines would be 
decreased, and whatever dangers posed to commercial surface and peaceful submerged 
navigation by active mines following de-escalation of tensions could be easily eliminated 
by simply turning the mines off. The greatest challenge for an effective and legally 
unobjectionable mining operation lies in the U.S. ability to further develop new 
technology which would incorporated the remote-control capabilities in such a way as to 
minimize the potential danger to commercial international navigation and to U.S. forces. 
Minimizing the danger of mines to peaceful navigation is an essential element in keeping 
within the legal limits of mining. Therefore, in addition to notification and channeling, 
a capability to activate/deactivate the mines or make them discriminate among targets 
would increase the span of situations where mining is acceptable under international law. 
Laying a RECO-controlled minefield could be seen as a weapons "predeployment" phase 
and no more an "act of war" than any other (pre) deployment of forces and ordnance in 
an already hostile region.78 
78Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division R43, J. Scarzello letter memo, 
"Comments on RECO/IFFM," to A10, F. Brinck, Silver Spring, MD, 12 March 1993. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focused on the advantages and disadvantages of a "pro-active" mine 
warfare strategy, with the aim of deterring future opponents from initiating a mining 
campaign. The United States has not only failed to recognize the strategic significance 
of an offensive mining and mine countermeasure strategy aimed at deterrence, but it has 
also failed to sustain an adequate capability in naval mine warfare, particularly in 
comparison to its other warfighting capabilities. Both "From the Sea" and the "Bottom-up 
Review" acknowledge the grave threat that mines present to the littoral area of operations, 
and identify mine warfare elements as key components of naval expeditionary forces.79 
History has shown that, so far, the implementation of these "acknowledgements" has taken 
a back seat to other "more important" priorities. The United States continues to observe 
the naval tradition of peacetime neglect of mine matters, and as Rear Admiral McCauley, 
Commander, Mine Warfare Force, predicted in 1973: 
Rarely will anyone in today's Navy argue against the effectiveness of mine 
warfare nor our vulnerability as a nation to its use by other powers. Yet 
the practical demise of the Mine Force in the U.S. Navy is already 
planned, a victim of other more sophisticated higher priority programs.80 
If the United States is to successfully project forces ashore in support of future 
amphibious operations, it must project a sense of dire consequences toward nations who 
engage in mine laying activities. It must therefore possess the strategic and tactical 
capabilities that will deter, and if necessary, defeat the minelayer before he leaves the 
port.  This offensively orientated strategy would not only send a clear message that the 
791994 Mine Warfare Plan, p. 2. 
80Melia, p. 133. 
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United States will no longer tolerate such acts of aggression, but project a long lasting 
deterrent for those nations who question U.S. resolve. 
B.  GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The use of RECO mines before and during hostilities, needs to be examined 
further. Most important, the use of RECO mines, unlike armed mines, does not cross the 
legal limits of international law. Essentially, laying a RECO minefield is similar to 
creating a naval blockade, except that the risks to U.S. naval ships are less. Deploying 
a minefield would carry a clearer message of U.S. intentions than ambiguous diplomatic 
signals. This would be particularly true when dealing with renegade governments that 
show little concern for diplomacy or that openly support international terrorism. RECO 
mines can be used effectively as a psychological deterrent. When offensive mining is 
done properly, it could send just the right "deterrent" message, and may require only a 
few "unarmed" mines to be laid. Unfortunately, the Navy has invested very little in mine 
warfare as a whole, and even less in mining research and development. The Navy 
currently spends over $200 million each year for research and development on mine 
countermeasures, but spends only $3 million each year for the research and development 
of mines.81 An even more discouraging fact is that the entire cost of all active and 
reserve U.S. Navy funding for mine warfare, accounts for less than one-half of one 
percent of the U.S. Navy budget.82 
The decision to use offensive mining and mine countermeasures tactics before or 
during a crisis, is serious and carries potentially escalatory results, but the implications 
of not mining or neutralizing an enemy minelayer can be far more detrimental to the 
United States in the long run. 
81Horne, Charles F. III., RADM, "Modern Offensive / Defensive Mining for From the 
Sea - Regional Conflict," point-paper, 22 February 1994, p. 2. 
82Dicker, R.J.L., "Mine Warfare Now and in the 1990s," International Defense Review 
19, 1993, p. 294. 
62 
As the United States enters an era of smaller naval forces, armed with a doctrine 
that emphasizes littoral operations, the value of investing in the "weapon that waits" 
should be obvious. The investment must be balanced, equally supporting integration of 
naval mining into overall doctrine and continued investment into research and 
development of naval mines and mine-delivery systems. The U.S. Navy, faced with these 
realities, must establish a commitment to naval mining, or continue to be a second-class 
mine warfare force.83 The United States can no longer afford to simply "damn the 
torpedoes," and fall victim to the numerous unpredictable aggressors that will surface in 
the future. It must take a more serious approach to naval mine warfare strategy, tactics, 
and technology, while embracing a proactive strategy of offensive mining and mine 
countermeasures aimed at deterring future aggressors, for the conflicts of the future will 
not wait for the United States to catch up. 
C.  SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
Specific conclusions regarding the implementation of an offensively orientated 
mine warfare strategy are these: 
1.   Current Problems and Issues with RECO and IFFM 
First, although RECO and IFFM technologies has been available for the past 20 
years, an insufficient investment in research and development have prevented them from 
being accepted as a viable and "safe" mining option. Secondly, the decision to employ 
RECO mining may not be fully accepted because of the potential political and military 
risks associated with the escalation of a conflict and the safety of U.S. forces afloat. 
a.  RECO and IFFM Solutions 
A nominal investment in mining, as outlined in Chapter IV, would allow 
RECO and IFFM capabilities to meet acceptable safety standards by FY98. Once safety 
standards have been achieved and a working knowledge of the capabilities of each system 
83 Keller, p. 46. 
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are understood by decision makers, the political decision to employ this capability may 
in fact be viewed as a more humanitarian solution than other options of military force. 
2.  Current Problems and Issues with Rules of Engagement 
An on-scene commander does not have the authority to "defend" his ship from a 
vessel that is laying mines in international waters. This act of aggression places a United 
States naval asset, and the lives of those on board, in severe jeopardy. 
a.   Rules of Engagement Solutions 
The JCS Rules of Engagement that govern the actions of an on-scene 
commander with respect to his inherent right of self-defense should be re-examined. It 
should be clear that a vessel laying mines in international waters does so with the intent 
of indiscriminately inflicting damage on another nation's assets. A nation which engages 
in this form of warfare should be seen as a direct threat to the safety of all who transit 
the high seas. 
D.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Implementation of the following recommendations should directly reduce the threat 
of future enemy mining, thereby, enhancing the United States ability to successfully 
project forces ashore in support of future amphibious operations. 
1. RECOandlFFM 
The U.S. Navy should invest sufficient funds in the Research and Development 
of RECO and IFFM capability which would enable both capabilities to be used safely and 
simultaneously, with little or no risk to friendly forces. 
2. Rules of Engagement 
Current ROE fail to adequately address the use of force against a known minelayer 
during peacetime, therefore, an on-scene commander is placed in a vulnerable and 
potentially dangerous position. These ROE should be re-examined and confront the 
inevitable threat U.S. naval forces will face in future conflicts. Once conclusive evidence 
is obtained that a vessel is engaging in minelaying activities, a commander must be 
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allowed to protect his ship and the lives of his crew.   The right of self-defense should 
include the right to defend oneself against enemy mines. 
3.  Areas For Further Research 
The following related areas are recommended for further research: 
a. Offensive Mining of Inland Waterways 
b. SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Mine Countermeasures 
65 
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APPENDIX A.  REST OF WORLD MINE PRODUCERS 
NATION NAME TYPE ACTUATION WARHEAD 
Chili MS-L Bottom Magnetic ? 
Chili MS-C Bottom Magnetic ? 
Chili Stonefish Bottom M,A,P 500kg 
Denmark MTP-19 Bottom Remote 300kg 
France TSM 3510 Bottom M,A 530kg 
France TSM 3530 Bottom M,MA 1000kg 
France FG29 Bottom M,A,P 600kg 
France FG 18 Bottom ? 7 
Germany G-l Bottom 7 535kg 
Germany G-2 Bottom M,A,P ? 
Germany IGM 10 Bottom MAP 7 
Germany SAI Bottom ? ? 
Iraq Sigeel/400 Bottom Influence 400kg 
Iraq Al Muthena/35 Bottom Contact 35kg 
Iraq Al Muthena/45 Bottom Contact 45kg 
Iraq Al Kaakaa/16 Bottom Remote 8165kg 
Italy MR-80/MRP A Bottom MAP 460kg 
Italy MR-80/MRP B Bottom MAP 630kg 
Italy MR-80/MRP C Bottom MAP 870kg 
Italy Manta Bottom M,A 150-180kg 
Italy Seppia Moored Influence 200kg 
Italy MAS/22 Bottom Contact 17kg 
Italy MAL/17 Moored Contact 17kg 
Italy TAR 6 Moored Contact 175kg 
Italy WP900 Bottom MAP 7 
Italy VS-SM-600 Bottom MAP 600kg 
Japan K-33 Moored Contact ? 
Japan Type-70 Bottom Influence ? 
Japan Type-56 Moored Contact 136kg 
Japan Type-55 Moored Contact 100kg 
South Africa Stonefish Bottom MAP 500kg 
Sweden Type 74 Moored 9 7 
Sweden Type 77 Bottom Pressure ? 
Sweden GMI 100 Bottom Influence 105kg 
Sweden MMI 80 Moored Influence 80kg 
Sweden Bunny Bottom MAP ? 
Sweden LYDIA Bottom Acoustic 7 
Taiwan WMS 110 Bottom Influence ? 
Taiwan WSM 210 Bottom Influence 7 
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APPENDIX A. (CONT) 
NATION NAME TYPE ACTUATION WARHEAD 
UK Sea Urchin Bottom M,A,P 1200kg 
UK Sea Urchin Moored M,A,P 1200kg 
UK Stonefish Bottom M.A.P 600kg 
UK Stonefish Bottom M,A,P 500kg 
UK Dragonfish Bottom 2x Influence 80kg 
UK Mk5 Bottom ? ? 
UK Mk 12 Bottom ? ? 
UK Mk 17 Moored Acoustic ? 
Yugoslavia M70 Bottom M,A 700kg 
Yugoslavia PLRM-1A Drifting Contact 10kg 
(Source: 1992 Mine Warfare Plan) 
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APPENDIX B.  MINE PRODUCING COMPANIES 
COMPANY 
AB PRECISION (POOLE) LTD 
AEG AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
AEROJET TECHSYSTEMS 




BODENSEEWERK GERATETECHNIK GMBH 
BOFORS A/B 
BRITISH AEROSPACE AUSTRALIA 
BRITISH AEROSPACE PLC 
BRITISH AEROSPACE (DYNAMICS) LTD 
CHACONSA 
CHINA STATE SHIPBUILDING 
CONSUB EQUIPMENTOS E SERVICOS 
COR INC 
DALIAN WARSHIP INST 
DANISH AEROTECHNOLOGYSYSTEMS A/S 
DBE TECHNOLOGY GROUP 
DEWEY ELECTRONICS CORP 
DORNIER 
DOWTY DEFENSE AND AIR SYSTEMS LTD 
DYNAMIT NOBEL AG 
EQUIPOS ELECTRON1COS EESA 
ERICSON RADIO SYSTEMS 
EXPAL 
FABRICAS Y MAESTIANZAS DE EJERTO 
FAUN-HAG LAUFAD PEGNTTZ 
FERRANTI - CHEADLE HEATH DIVISION 
FFV 
FREQUENCY ENGINEERING LABORATORIES 
GEC AVIONICS 
GEC-MARCONI ELECTRONIX 
GIDROPRIBOR CENTRAL RESEARCH INST 
GOODYEAR AEROSPACE DIVISION 
GOULD 
HITACHI ZOSEN CO LTD 
HONEYWELL - UNDERSEA SYSTEMS DIV 
HUNTING ENGINEERING 
INDUSTRIAS CARDOEN 
KENG CHIEH ENTERPRISES 
INISEL 




LORAL SYSTEMS GROUP 
MARCONI UNDERWATER SYSTEMS 
























































REPAIR CRAFT LTD (UK) 
ROYAL ORDNANCE PLC (UK) 
SA MARINE A/B (SWE) 
SHORT BROTHERS (UK) 
SIMA (PERU) 
SOCIETA INDUSTRIALE CARDANA (SPA) 
SPERRY GYROSCOPES (USA) 




THOMSON SENTRA ASM (FRANCE) 
THORN EMI ELECTRONICS LTD (UK) 
VALSELLA MECCANOTECNICA (ITA) 
UNDERWATER STORAGE (UK) 
WHITEHEAD MOTOFIDES (ITA) 
(Primary Sources: Aero and Defense Markets Database, Jane's International Defense Directory 90, Jane's 
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